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The opposition is part 
of the government
One of the greatest risks in forming a
coalition is the possibility that the
opposition will turn into a destabilizing
and destructive force in the political
system. In mature democracies, by
contrast, the opposition is part of the
government system that controls the
coalition Government, encourages
political competition, and helps
increase the effectiveness of
Government policies. A look at relations
between the Government and the
opposition in such democracies shows
that there are certain regularities that
affect the stability of the political
system.
Firstly, the confrontation between
Government and opposition must
contain incentives for competition
within a single political system rather
than its break-up. In the majority of
mature democracies, the dividing line
between the political parties competing
as Government and opposition tends be
economic ideology. The division into
leftists and rightists most frequently
reflects two primary economic interest
groups: labor and capital. The
confrontation of these interests as a
political competition between rightist
and leftist parties can be a positive
phenomenon for the country’s economy,
working like the two pedals of a bicycle
that rotate the connecting chain and
move the entire mechanism.
Political parties can also represent other
bipolar interests in a society: urban vs
rural, state vs church, regional vs
national. However, the most important
thing is that the confrontation between
the Government and the opposition over
differing interests not destroy the
political system. It is the responsibility
of the political elite to work towards
consensus on those key issues that
might lead to a split in the society.
Secondly, an important feature of a
stable political system is having rules
for political competition that make it
possible for the opposition to come to
power in a constitutional and
democratic manner. This means that the
Government makes no attempts to
marginalize the opposition, to remove
its positions from public discourse, or to
ignore its opinions. Political guarantees
for the opposition can be provided
through institutionalized privileges,
such as oversight of certain government
bodies, distribution of offices to
effectively oversee government
activities, or access to the media. 
If those parties that won an election try
to marginalize their opponents, there is
a likelihood that the political system
will break up. For example, the common
perception of socialist and communist
parties as “agents of influence” in
Europe and the reluctance to cooperate
with them in the early 20th century
only aggravated the political situation
and set the stage for civil conflicts.
Only after these parties were recognized
as full-fledged participants and
governments initiated constructive
cooperation, did it become possible 
to stabilize these political systems.
In Central Europe, where, unlike most
FSU countries, the fall of communism
was immediately followed by a
continuous process of democratization
and transition to a market economy,
party systems were mostly formed by
transforming the former anti-communist
opposition into rightist parties—
liberals and conservatives—, while the
old communist parties, after going
through lustration, renewal and internal
democratization turned into “new
leftist parties,” the social-democrats.
This did not happen in Ukraine because,
during the same period, the country’s
political forces were fighting for
national independence and democracy.
So Ukraine’s party system is only now
being formed in a stable democratic
environment.
An Orange coalition preserves
the slogans of the Maidan
An Orange coalition of the Block of Yulia
Tymoshenko, Nasha Ukraina and the
Socialist Party will automatically lead to
an opposition of the Party of the Regions
and the Communist Party. The main
factor uniting this coalition is a common
“Orange” past, with the Maidan as the
symbol of democracy fighting
authoritarianism, political pressure and
rigged elections. The “Blue-and-white”
successors of the Kuchma regime embody
the latter for “Orange” voters.
Yet, this particular fault line does not
exist for the Party of the Regions and its
voters, as they do not see themselves as
“undemocratic.” That is why PR has
established its opposition to BYT and NU
along other, more artificial lines:
Western Ukraine vs Eastern Ukraine,
integration with the EU and NATO vs
integration with the CEA,
Ukrainian-speakers vs Russian-speakers,
and unindustrialized towns vs large
industrial cities. This kind of
confrontation between the government
and the opposition will preserve the
“division” of Ukraine by geography,
language and history, and foreign
political orientation. Although some
these differences are largely mythical,
they are convenient “markers” for both
politicians and voters to stake out their
positions.
There is one thing that all participants in the negotiations to set up a coalition
need to be constantly reminded of: their responsibility is not just to form 
a Verkhovna Rada coalition and a Government. By forming a coalition based 
on certain principles, these political forces are also identifying the ideological
contrasts that will form the basic dividing line between the Government 
and the opposition. This means that the Government coalition will determine
the role of the political opposition and the scope of its activity
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The threat to Ukraine’s future posed by a
confrontation along these lines is
evident: the lack of national consensus
on Ukraine’s geopolitical choice, Russian
intervention in support of one political
force, and possible separatism. In
addition, different economic views
within the “Orange” coalition could
hamper the effectiveness of government
policies. Nasha Ukraine will insist on
establishing favorable conditions for
investment, enshrining ownership rights
and privatizing further, whereas BYT and
SPU will stand for bringing to justice
opaque and unfair privatizations,
increasing social outlays, increasing the
role of the state as a regulator, and
blocking unpopular reforms, such as land
reform and reforms to social security. 
A NU–PR coalition = 
right vs left?
According to voters and politicians
themselves, differences between the
interests of leftists and rightists are not
yet determining factors for voter
preferences. Neither its supporters, nor
its opponents view the Party of the
Regions as a party of liberal, democratic
ideology. So far, it remains more of a
backlash project because so many
Kuchmaera officials and businessmen
from a single region were on this party’s
list.
By moving into the opposition, BYT and
SPU would oppose the government, not
on the basis of leftist–centrist ideology,
but on the basis of fighting those who
“betrayed the Maidan,” against Kuchma
supporters and business clans. As a
result, the remaining Nasha Ukraina
electorate would likely switch to BYT,
while PR would lose part of their
electorate to the Bloc of Natalia
Vitrenko and the Communist Party if it
completely reneged on key platform
slogans.
“Orange” voters would see this coalition
not as a way to unify the country, but as
the collusion of the political and
business elites of two parties in order to
distribute the country’s assets. The fear
is that such a coalition would reinstate
privileges for traditional businesses of
the Donetsk clan and not encourage
upgrading Ukraine’s industry, that it
would hamper legal reforms to improve
the business environment, increase
social inequality, and foster corruption.
This option is very negatively viewed by
all “Orange” voters, as well as by the
radically pro-Russian among
“Blue-and-white” voters. Yet a coalition
involving Nasha Ukraina and Regions
under the slogan of unification and an
opposition consisting of BYT and SPU is
something that everybody should begin
to think about as a desirable option. 
The two parties have similar economic
ideologies, which would make it
possible for the coalition to implement
well-coordinated economic and social
policies aimed at improving budget
discipline, fostering investment and
enlivening economic growth through
favorable conditions for all types of
businesses. The main opposition would
consist of SPU and BYT, who position
themselves as parties of the center-left.
Should this configuration be chosen,
theoretically, the country could form a
new dominating line of confrontation
between the Government and the
opposition that, as in the majority 
of mature democracies, would match 
the main public interests in the
economy: capital and labor.
The experience of EU countries has
shown the effectiveness of such a
political dividing line for the country’s
economic well-being. This makes
competing interest groups work in one
team by allowing those who can earn
money to work and supporting those
who cannot. This, in turn, fosters a
general enrichment of the country and
growing well-being for all social groups.
How to reformulate the main
dividing line
Political parties themselves are
responsible for basing the line of
confrontation on issues linked to the
past—democracy vs a repressive regime
and Eastern Ukraine vs Western
Ukraine—, instead of issues connected
to the future—greater democracy and
economic reforms. Nasha Ukraina, in
particular, built its election campaign
on the idea of fighting the comeback of
the “Blue-and-whites.” BYT also built
on the threat that Regions would return
to power and the supposed betrayal of
the Maidan by a “former Orange ally.” 
At the same time, PR offered itself as an
alternative to the lack of economic
skills among the “Orange” parties and
once again raised the status of the
Russian language and Ukraine’s
membership in NATO vs the CEA. Both
BYT and the Party of the Regions based
their economic planks on populist
leftish slogans, which made it more
difficult to identify their real economic
views.
The result was the lack of competition
among platforms during the election
campaign, because the country’s
political parties did not position
themselves according to their economic
ideologies. So, voters identified
political forces, not according to
economic principles, but by geographic,
value-based and cultural features. This
was reflected in the results of the 2004
and 2006 elections, which demonstrated
that the borders of basic ideological
differences lie, not between different
social groups or supporters of specific
economic ideologies, but more between
two regions.
On one hand, this division will continue
to exist as long as real and mythical
fears among the two groups of voters are
connected to one or another political
force—that is, as long as “Orange”
voters worry that the country will return
to authoritarianism, more corruption and
loss of the national identity to Russia,
while “Blue-and-white” voters worry
about breaking up with Russia and
integrating into the “hostile” North
Atlantic alliance. 
On the other, the future coalition has a
unique chance to deliberately
re-formulate the main “line of conflict”
into the center of constructive
competition between the Government
and the opposition. In many aspects,
this is like the situation in the US after
the Civil War, when the country faced a
choice: whether to continue the conflict
between the North and the South by
making it the main conflict between US
parties or to overcome it by uniting the
country and including the opposition in
the political system and reconstructing
the party system along some other lines
of confrontation. This will determine the
further development of the country: as a
confrontation of regional interests or as
a competition of different economic
policies.
For additional information, contact
Director of ICPS Vira Nanivska 
at (38044) 4844400 or at
vnanivska@icps.kiev.ua.
icps newsletter is a weekly publication of the International Centre 
for Policy Studies, delivered by electronic mail. 
To be included in the distribution list, mail your request to:
marketing@icps.kiev.ua.
icps newsletter editor: Yevhen Shulha (shulha@icps.kiev.ua)
Phone: (38044) 4844400. Fax: (38044) 4844402.
English text editor: L.A. Wolanskyj
Articles may be reprinted with ICPS consent.
The International Centre for Policy Studies is an independent research
organization whose mandate is to promote the introduction of public
policy concepts and practices in Ukraine. This is achieved by
increasing the knowhow of key government officials for policy
choices, formulation and debate, and the awareness of the publicat
large of the benefits of policy.
Address: vul. Pymonenka 13A, Kyiv, Ukraine 04050
Website: http://www.icps.com.ua/eng/
